Market Interdependence and Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Comment by Cebula, Richard
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Market Interdependence and
Third-Degree Price Discrimination:
Comment
Richard Cebula
Jacksonville University
15. September 1979
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56738/
MPRA Paper No. 56738, posted 18. June 2014 23:43 UTC
  
Page 1 
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Beginning with the writing of A.C. Pigou [2] and Joan Robinson [3], third-degree price 
discrimination has been treated extensively in the literature.  A monopolist who operates in 
two or more markets may charge different prices to different groups of consumers for the same 
product.  Also, a manufacturer may sell a product to different distributors at a uniform price, 
but may induce the distributors to resell the product in different markets at different mark-ups 
[1 and 5].  Although it is commonly assumed (see, for example, [4]) that the markets of a firm 
practicing price discrimination are independent, third-degree price discrimination is sometimes 
practice in interdependent market (that is, the quantity sold in one market is a function of the 
quantity  sold in each of the remaining markets).  A familiar example is the “singles bar,” where 
individuals congregate in order to meet members of the opposite sex.  Frequently the price of 
admission for males differs from the price of admission for females.  In addition, the markets 
which are served by the singles bar interdependent, since the presence of a relatively large 
number of females (males) serves to attract additional males (females).  Many other examples 
of such interdependence can be given. 
 The purpose of this note is to develop a model of third-degree price discrimination in 
which the quantities sold in each market are interdependent.  We demonstrate that in this 
situation the price differential may be explained not only in terms of price elasticity 
differentials, as is typically the case, but also in terms of the market interdependency.   
 Let us assume that a monopolist practices third-degree price discrimination in two 
interdependent markets.1   Total profits, TPro, are equal to2 
 
(1) TPro = P1(q1,q2) · q1(P1,q2) + P2(q2,q1) ) · q2(P2,q1)  ̶  TC(Q),  
 
where P1 = price in Market 1, q1 = output in Market 1, P2 = price in Market 2, q2 = output in 
Market 2, TC = total cost, and Q (Q = q1 + q2) = total output. 
 Partially differentiating Equation (1) with respect to q1 and q2 yields 
 
(2) Ƌ TPro/Ƌq1 = P1(1 + 1/e1) + ƋRev2/Ƌq1  ̶  MC(1 + Ƌq2/Ƌq1) and 
(3)   Ƌ TPro/Ƌq2 = P2(1 + 1/e2) + ƋRev1/Ƌq2  ̶  MC(1 + Ƌq1/Ƌq2), 
 
where e1 and e2 = price elasticity of demand in Markets 1 and 2, respectively; REV refers to the 
total revenue; and MC refers to marginal cost.  After setting Equations (2) and (3) equal to zero 
to maximize profits, it is simple to show that  
 
(4) [P1(1 + 1/e1) + ƋRev2/Ƌ q1]/(1 + Ƌq2/Ƌq1) = [P2(1 + 1/e2) + ƋRev1/Ƌq2]/(1 + Ƌq1/Ƌq2). 
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Given maximum profits, 
 
(5) P1  = [P2(1 + 1/e2)(1 + Ƌq2/Ƌq1)  ̶  ƋRev2/Ƌq1(1 + Ƌq1/Ƌq2) 
         + ƋRev1/Ƌq2(1 + Ƌq2/Ƌq1)]/[( 1 + 1/e1)(1 + Ƌq1/Ƌq2)] 
and 
 
(6) P2  = [P1(1 + 1/e1)(1 + Ƌq1/Ƌq2)  ̶  ƋRev1/Ƌq2(1 + Ƌq2/Ƌq1) 
         + ƋRev2/Ƌq1(1 + Ƌq1/Ƌq2)]/[( 1 + 1/e2)(1 + Ƌq2/Ƌq1)]. 
 
Here P1 may be less than, equal to or greater than P2 regardless of the size of e1 and e2.  Even if 
e1 = e2, P1 may not (and probably would not) be equal to P2. If e1 = e2, letting (1 + 1/e1) = X. we 
have 
 
(7) P1  = [P2(X) (1 + Ƌq2/Ƌq1) + ƋRev1/Ƌq2(1 + Ƌq2/Ƌq1)]/ [X(1 + Ƌq1/Ƌq2)]  ̶  (ƋRev2/Ƌq1)(X -1) 
 
and 
 
(8) P2  = [P1(X) (1 + Ƌq1/Ƌq2) + ƋRev2/Ƌq1(1 + Ƌq1/Ƌq2)]/ [X(1 + Ƌq2/Ƌq1)]  ̶  (ƋRev1/Ƌq2)(X -1). 
 
Not only are price differentials attributable to price elasticity differentials, but also to 
interdependent utility functions per se.  As can be seen in Equations (7) and (8), even if price 
elasticities are equal, price differentials are to be expected except under the most extraordinary 
conditions.  Clearly, these results can be generalized to the “n” interdependent market case; 
moreover, there a myriad of possible applications of this analysis. 
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NOTES 
 
*I wish to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and also Milton Z. Kafoglis for aid 
in formulating Note 1 and in developing the basic model. 
1. The model presented her must be distinguished from the seemingly similar, but actually 
quite different, analysis in [4].  There are at least two important fundamental differences 
between the present model and that in [4].  To begin with, Heinrich von Stackleberg [4, p.65] 
distinguishes “….two forms of price discrimination according to whether the market division is 
brought into being by the monopolist himself or is a datum for him.”  The model in [4] deals 
exclusively with the former case.  In particular, the model in [4], which can result in first-degree 
discrimination (see [6]), is concerned with the case “…in which it is assumed that not only price 
fixing, but also the division of the market depends upon the entrepreneur” [4, p. 65].  By 
contrast, to [4], the model presented here deals with the general case where segmentation is a 
“datum” for the monopolist; in contrast to [4], the market in this analysis is not arbitrarily 
segmented at will by the monopolist. 
 The second major difference, perhaps the more important one, is that the von 
Stackleberg paper [4] does not deal with market interdependence; in point of fact, as is 
common, [4] expressly deals with a case where the firm’s markets are independent.  By 
contrast, this paper deals expressly with the case where the firm’ markets are interdependent.  
In fact, von Stackleberg’s basic profit equation [4, p.68] is a special case of the more general 
Equation (1) of this paper. 
2. It is assumed here that there are no marginal cost differentials from operation in 
Markets 1 and 2. 
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